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Book Reviews
PUBLIUS FOR ALL OF US
THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST: HOW
HAMILTON AND MADISON RECONCEIVED
AMERICA. By Dan T. Coenen. 1 Twelve Tables Press.
2007. Pp. xi+ 406. $28.95 paper.
Brannon P. Denning"

The eighty-five essays written by Alexander Hamilton and
James Madison (with an assist from John Jay)-known
collectively as The Federalist- have attained canonical status
among the documents of the Founding Era. And yet for all of
the ink spilled recently over the Founders and the Framing Era,
little recent attention has been given to The Federalist itself. One
of the most famous popular commentaries on The Federalist,
Garry Wills's Explaining America, is over twenty-five years old.
Other treatments are either older or geared towards the
specialist. 3 That gap in the literature makes Dan Coenen's The
4
Story ofThe Federalist particularly timely.
Contrary to what one might think by reading the title,
Coenen has not simply written a narrative telling the story of
how Madison, Hamilton, and Jay came to write the papers, or
the role that the papers played (or didn't play) in the
1. Universitv Professor and Harmon W. Caldwell Chair in Constitutional Law.
University of Geo;gia School of Law.
2. Professor and Director of Faculty Development. Cumberland School of Law.
Samford University. Thanks to Dan Coenen for a careful reading of a prior draft.
3. See, e.g., DAVID F. EPSTEIN. THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST
(1984): GOTTFRIED DIETZ. THE FEDERALIST: A CLASSIC ON FEDERALISM AND FREE
GOVERNMENT (1960): MORTON WHITE. PHILOSOPHY. THE FEDERALIST. AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1987): GARRY WILLS. EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST
(1981).

4. Michael I. Meyerson has recently published Liberty's Blueprint: How Madison
and Hamilton Wrote the Federalist Papers, Defined the Constitution, and Made
Democracy Safe for the World (2008). which argues. among other things. that The
Federalist had an enormous impact on the success of the ratification effort.
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Constitution ·s eventual ratification. That story is included, but
sandwiched in between Coenen's account of the essays' writing
and publication is a rich and accessible introduction to The
Federalist's political thought.
Foremost among the book's strengths is Coenen's deft
organization. A lover of mercy, Coenen does not frog march
readers through each of The Federalist's eighty-five essays.
Instead, he organizes his book into five parts: Parts I and V tell
the story of The Federalist's origin and execution, along with its
role in the ratification of the Constitution and its lasting impact
on constitutional law and American political thought.
Sandwiched in between, however, is an analysis of the work
itself. Part II explains the rhetorical style of the essays.' Part III
describes The Federalist's case for change, which was not as
obvious to all as it was to the Constitution's prominent backers.
Part IV then takes up The Federalist's brief for the new
government the Constitution had created.
I.

In the Preface, Coenen offers an explanation for the lack of
interest in The Federalist relative to the enormous interest shown
over the last ten years in the Framers themselves and in
Framing-era history. "There are just too many obstacles,'' he
writes. "the coverage of technical topics, an unfamiliar literary
style. allusions to then-current but now-forgotten events, the
length of the work, its density and detail" (p. ix). His intention.
then. is to situate the papers in context and tell their story. as
well as "lay out the central messages of The Federalist in a
readable fashion" and "consider how the papers matter today"
(p. x). His hope. he writes. is "to pique interest in the papers."
and to encourage people to read the original (p. xi).
He begins with the origins of the essays. Troubled by the
prospects for the Constitution's ratification in New York,
Hamilton sought a seat at New York's ratifying convention, and
then embarked on a writing campaign to produce a
comprehensive set of essays favoring ratification. After several
prominent persons turned him down, James Madison, in town
for a session of the Confederation Congress, agreed to
5. This part draws on Dan T. Coenen. A Rhetoric for Ratification: The Argument
of The Federalist and Its Impact on Constitutional Interpretation. 56 DUKE L.J. 469
(2006 ).
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collaborate, as did John Jay (p. 5). Illness forced Jay to bow out.
leaving this unlikely pair- the volatile, confident Hamilton and
the shy, bookish Madison-with the laboring oar. And labor
they did. Hamilton's Federalist No. I appeared on October 27.
1787, with Jay's Federalist No. 2 appearing three days later:
Madison's first, Federalist No. IO, appeared a little less than a
month after Hamilton's on November 22. 1787 (pp. 8. 13). The
last of the eighty-five essays appeared an astonishing seven
months after the first on May 28. 1788." "[T]he pace of
production was breathtaking. Altogether, the essayists pumped
out over 190,000 words. more than three essays per week. and
almost 2.300 words per essay" (p. 16). Initially published in one
of several local papers. "[ e ]ach of the essays, after its initial
printing, appeared in at least one additional newspaper: many
appeared in all four," though publication outside New Y ark was
"limited" (pp. 17, 18).
Hamilton and Madison had little time to consult with one
another on each other's essays (p. 15). and thus Coenen notes
that it is "not surprising that some historians have reported the
discovery of internal dissonance, if not outright schizophrenia. in
the pages of The Federalist" (p. 21). Others have stressed how
similar the papers are, and how consistent over the course of the
7
essays. Coenen stresses the consistency of "Publius" rather than
emphasizing any "schizophrenia" (p. 22). Moreover. he follows
many historians in attributing authorship of the "disputed"
papers to Madison instead of Hamilton (p. 22). Hamilton and
Madison were to go their separate ways politically after their
historic collaboration, but the quantity and quality of the essays
produced continue to command our respect.'
II.
Having identified an "unfamiliar literary style" (p. ix) as one
of the barriers to contemporary appreciation of The Federalist. it
6. Most know that Jay produced only a few essays. Coenen writes that illness was
the primary reason. Jay did return to contribute the Federalis£ No. 6-1. his fifth. in March
of 1788. but ··[a] month later. the unlucky statesman was hit in the head with a brick
during a street riot"" and was unable to 'contribute any more essays (p. 14. footnote
omitted).
7. ""Publius·· was the pen name used in the essays (p. 5).
8. For those keeping score. even with Madison being awarded authorship of the
disputed papers. ""Hamilton's contribution was preponderant. The New Yorker produced
51 essays. spread over 352 pages. as compared to Madison's 29 tracts and 221 pages·· (p.
22. footnote omitted).
'
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is fitting that Coenen begins his discussion with The Federalist's
rhetorical style. The papers, he writes, "embodied, first and
foremost, a vigorous effort at persuasion aimed at a particular
audience situated in a particular time and place. That effort
centered on reasoned argument" as well as "appeals to emotion
and credibility'' (p. 27). They were, at bottom, "campaign
literature" (p. 28) and addressed the pressing issues of the day:
the weakness of the Confederation government, interstate trade
conflicts, and the specter of violence in the form of Shay's
Rebellion (p. 29). The essays "did not draw [their] greatest
strength from appeals to lofty abstractions" but rather from
appeals to the circumstances of the time and the good sense of
the authors' audience (p. 28).
In fact. Hamilton and Madison were not above a little
flattery. They argued that the virtuous and generous citizens of
all the United States would, when the facts were before them,
see how the new government was essential to the future success
of the country. For while the particular problems of New York
were discussed (pp. 30-31), Publius's essays were not entirely
parochial- appealing to planters, manufacturers, merchants,
urban and rural dwellers alike (p. 30). Further, they invited
readers to draw lessons from history, both ancient and modern,
in support of their project (pp. 32-37). They often portrayed
opponents of ratification (whom they shrewdly characterized as
"antifederalists") as succumbing to undue suspicion, even
paranoia (p. 39). By contrast, "the voice of The Federalist took
on the tone of a trustworthy and omniscient neutral, marked by
a rhetorical detachment calculated to contribute to the
credibility of the overall project" (p. 42). This neutrality was
bolstered by the authors' willingness to discuss the Constitution's
9
shortcomings and concede that some of the line-drawing
involved in its provisions was arbitrary (pp. 44-45). But, the
essays often pointed out, the document was the product of
politically necessary compromises (p. 43). Both strategies
"buil[ t] a bridge of candor to their readers designed to reinforce
the credibility of their larger project" (p. 45).
Both men recognized the utility of non-reasoned arguments
as well. Appeals to emotion, appeals to logic leavened "by
9. Coenen also notes that both men defended provisions each had vigorously
condemned at the Philadelphia Convention. Hamilton infamously supported life terms
for the President and Senators. Madison had vigorously objected to equal representation
of states in the Senate (p. 46 ).
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mixing color, symbolism, and imagery'' as well as ''invocation of
America's revolutionary heritage" (pp. 51. 47), all played
important roles in The Federalist. As noted above, the essays
mocked antifederalist concerns with varying degrees of
aggressiveness, occasionally hinting that the objections to the
Constitution were so far-fetched they must be the product not of
real concern but of more sinister motives (p. 48). "With the
repeated tying of aspersion to reasoned argument," Coenen
writes, "Publius sowed the seeds of skepticism at a visceral level.
By portraying antifederalists as dark-hearted as well as wrongheaded, Hamilton and Madison appealed to deep-seated human
sensibilities connected up with pride, caution, indignation, and
even self-preservation" (p. 50).
Further, "[t]ime and again, Madison and Hamilton aligned
the Constitution, its framers, and its defenders with the spirit of
the American Revolution and the intellectual forces that had
given that revolution birth" (p. 53). In part, this invocation was
defensive, helping to "undercut concerns about the purported
unlawfulness of the Philadelphia Convention" (p. 54, footnote
omitted). Because the Revolution had come to be seen as a
unifying event for the nascent country, tapping into that
nationalist sentiment had obvious uses when the authors of The
Federalist were asking readers to undertake another leap of faith
in throwing the Articles of Confederation aside for an entirely
new type of government.
But Madison and Hamilton were not content merely to rest
on stating the logical or even the emotional case for the
Constitution. Both were practical men; both were very much
concerned with the pressing issues of the day. So The Federalist
went on to press the case for a strengthened central government
capable of meeting those challenges, and to describe in detail
how the authors saw the various parts of the new government
working-and to explain why a decrease in liberty did not
ineluctably follow from increased central power. It is in Parts III
and IV that Coenen hits his stride, first canvassing the themes to
which Publius recurred; then discussing Hamilton and Madison's
vigorous defense of the government that emerged from the
Constitution.
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III.
Coenen entitles the third part of The Story of The
Federalist, "Themes for a Nation." He explains that Hamilton
and Madison's key task was selling the need for "strengthening
the American union" (p. 59). The authors further invoked the
idea, often associated with Adam Smith, of yoking private
interest to the public good; and offered a particular take on the
ideology of "republicanism." These themes, which form a
superstructure for the rest of the papers, are important to
understanding the more specific defenses deployed against
opponents of ratification.
Encouraging affinity for a strong national government of
the "United States" was a tall order in an age when many
Americans, following Jefferson, considered their state to be their
"country." And yet creating such bonds of affection was
essential if the United States was to survive. Several problems
were present in the late 1780s; each looked to get worse, not
better. given the Articles' relative impotence. First, the parlous
state of the country's finances was giving rise to local uprisings,
like Shay's Rebellion. Second, interstate trade friction
threatened to ignite, becoming something more serious. This
instability, in turn, left the United States open to attack from
foreign powers eager to carve the U.S. up among them.
Hamilton and Madison's support for the Constitution was based
in part on the belief that the new government would have the
tools to meet these challenges. Publius sought to convince
readers this would be the case-that federal authority was
"vitalize(d]," but not too much (p. 60).
Taking these concerns in reverse order, many of the early
essays cited the danger of external attacks and the need to
111
prepare for them as a reason for centralizing power. For
Hamilton. Coenen writes. "(h]istory revealed that a loose
assemblage of states would not service this vital need" (p. 65).
Moreover. a strong military- a navy especially- was needed to
protect commercial shipping; thus did Hamilton's views on
national security dovetail with his vision for America as a
nascent economic power (p. 69). "Through all these discussions
ran the demand for a foreign policy that rested on the twin
foundations of union and strength," observes Coenen (p. 69).
10. '"According to The Federalist. forestalling the dangers of military attack
provided the leading reason to build a strong central government'" (p. 6R).
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Union meant that ''the central government needed the powers to
maintain standing armies. to outfit a navy, and to call on state
militias in times of national need" (p. 70). This power would, in
turn, ensure that the country's government could credibly
threaten the use of force if needed to protect its interests.''
Other threats were closer to home. "For Hamilton and
Madison, the drift toward disunion fostered by the Articles of
Confederation all but ensured future armed clashes among the
former allies of the Revolution" (p. 70). Chief among the sources
of friction were the accidents of geography that gave some states
advantages when it came to trade-advantages states like New
12
York exploited to the detriment of its neighbors. Publius
argued that other, looser confederations throughout history had
come to grief once their members began fighting for trade and
territory. Such disputes would then invite interference from
abroad, as European countries formed alliances with various
factions, playing each against the other (p. 73). A strong central
government, one with control over interstate commerce and with
its own source of funds, could counterbalance such centrifugal
tendencies.
Finally, a strong government was needed to repel localized
troubles, like Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts. "According to
Publius, a strong central government would counter the risk of
domestic insurrection in two powerful ways" (p. 75). First,
plotters would have to organize extensively in order to subjugate
the whole country, or even a part of it, raising the chances of
discovery. Second, the central government could bring enormous
resources to bear on local problems, to prevent them from
spreading (p. 75).
Publius's case for Union may seem like overkill, observes
Coenen, because even many antifederalists conceded the need
for augmented federal powers, including some independent
revenue-raising power and the power to regulate interstate
commerce. But Hamilton and Madison did not want fence-sitters
to think that these adjustments to the Articles were sufficient,
and pressed hard their case for an even stronger government.
11. "A government charged with waging war must always be prepared for it. and a
government required to bargain with foreign powers must be able to back up its
ultimatums with more than idle bluster" (p. 70).
12. For more on this. and the Constitution's response. see Brannon P. Denning.
Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce and the Legitimacy of the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine. 94 KY. L.J. 37 (2005-2006).
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Coenen writes that "[a] general emphasis on the value of the
union-particularly as a counterweight to war-rounded out the
development of" the themes in all eighty-five essays of The
Federalist (p. 77).
Hamilton and Madison knew that citizens harbored honest
worries about the Constitution's dramatic shift of power to
the central government. They also knew, however, that they
held two powerful cards in their hand. The first was the
shared belief, born of the Revolution, that strength and safety
lay in union. The second was the shared fear that the nation's
existing authority had reached a point of such "desperate
extremity" that it lacked the capacity to discharge even the
most basic responsibilities of government. With powerful
arguments, Hamilton and Madison reinforced this belief and
played on this fear, keeping in constant view the specter of
war and the terrible dangers it posed (p. 77).

If persuading a skeptical populace to invest a central
government with greater powers than any would have imagined
a decade earlier seemed a tall order. Madison took it upon
himself to further persuade readers that much of what they knew
about "civic republicanism" needed to be unlearned. In
Coenen's illuminating chapter on The Federalist No. 10, one of
the most famous documents in American political history, he
explains how Madison accomplished this. 13
"The first seminal contribution of No. 10 lay in its effort to
debunk [the] lionization of the small republic" (p. 80).
Presciently, Madison sensed that the United States had potential
to be one of the largest political units in history. Even the union
of thirteen states was too large for some antifederalists. The fear
was that large republics would fall prey to "faction," a pejorative
term in the eighteenth century, on par with "parties" that all
deemed fatal to a true republic. Madison, however, turned this
logic on its head. In his view, small republics were the ones most
likely to fail. Factions were inevitable; ''no republic-whatever
its size-could instill in 'every citizen the same opinions, the
same passions, and the same interests'" (p. 80, quoting Federalist
No. 10). Rather than attempt to suppress factions' emergence,
Madison sought "to place the public well-being over their own
13. There is a large literature on Federalist No. 10 and how influential it was or
wasn't in its day. Coenen acknowledges this literature in the notes. but he explains
Madison's essay on its own terms. He also reprints Federalist No. 10 in its entirety in
Appendix B (pp. 373-79).
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private interests" (p. 81). "In other words," writes Coenen,
"Madison stood ready not only to assert that the argument in
favor of small republics was misguided; he was also prepared to
claim that a much strengthened central government offered
powerful advantages in checking the excesses of factional
power" (p. 82, footnote omitted).
Further, Madison argued that majority factions were "the
greatest danger in self-ruling nations" because they could ride
roughshod over the rights of minorities (p. 82). But to suppress
the emergence of such factions was fruitless, according to
Madison, because such efforts led to tyranny and, ultimately, the
surrender of republican government. Better to set them against
one another in a large republic with a strong central government
so that (1) the sheer size of the country could hamper efforts by
any one faction to consolidate power with each acting to check
the overweening ambition of the others, and (2) "[t]he filtering
process of representative government ... would work best" by
having politics play on a national, rather than a local level (pp.
84-85).
Coenen notes the academic commentary that has
mushroomed around Federalist No. 10, but takes no sides,
concluding simply that "one thing is clear: Madison celebrated
the value of including multiple groups with different outlooks
within the body politic .... Madison's emphasis on inclusive
voting regimes reflected an attitude of openness to new forms of
human interaction" (p. 88). While it cannot be doubted that
large numbers of Americans were initially excluded from
participation, either because of sex or race or (at first) wealth,
the Constitution showed the way for those groups' inclusion in
the political community in the years to come (pp. 89-90).
Further, though it was not necessarily apparent to Publius at the
time, "No. 10 cemented the ... proposition that injustice prevails
when 51% of the citizenry captures 100% of state-created
benefits" (p. 91 ). The logic of that insight- that majorities could
be tyrannous-would lead to Madison's fight for the Bill of
Rights in the First Congress. 14
Coenen closes with some provocative questions about the
political theory of Federalist No. 10. Does Madison's theory of
contending factions indeed secure peace and stability, or does
14. See generally RICHARD LABCNSKI. JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2008).
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it simply entrench the status quo and frustrate revolutionary
and progressive politics? Whatever the answers, Coenen
claims that such questions "do not diminish the luminosity of
Federalist No. 10. Rather they reaffirm its status as the key
point of reference for judging the work of our constitutional
regime" (p. 91 ). Its themes "of inclusion, collaboration, rightsmindedness, and public-spiritedness" continue to have
relevance today (p. 91).
Contemporary historical scholarship abounds with
discussions of ·'republicanism" and the Framers' relationship
with it. There is no doubt that the Founders considered
themselves ardent "republicans"- as opposed to "democrats" or
"monarchists." They even guaranteed each state a "republican
form of government" in the Constitution." The Federalist
abounds with assurances that the proposed Constitution was not
only republican, but that it was more republican than the
Articles or other supposed paradigms of republicanism.
But what was republicanism? Historians continue to debate
the question, but Coenen argues that it had, for Publius, three
main tenets: ''(1) the ultimate sovereignty of the people, (2) the
republican nature of all branches of government, and (3) the
idea of distancing the people from the operations of their
government and from future control of the Constitution itself"
(p. 93).
The first of these is relatively straightforward- the
legitimacy of the government and its actions depended upon the
consent of those on whose behalf it acted. This was signified by,
inter alia, the special ratifying conventions that debated and
voted on the proposed Constitution. This was, moreover, a
national act, with the implication that the Union was something
that would be more than a mere confederation of states (pp. 9495).16 Moreover, Article V made clear the path for the People to
assert their sovereignty through constitutional amendments or,
ultimately, another constitutional convention.
By "republicanism in all the branches," Coenen means that
the authors of The Federalist departed in significant respects
from the received traditions of English government. In the latter,
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV.§ 4.
16. For an excellent treatment of the conventions. their origins in Revolutionaryera state constitutions. and their significance. see DAVID E. KYYIG. EXPLICIT AND
AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITL'TION. 1776-1995 (1996).
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societal classes are represented by different elements: the King
and Lords representing the "few" and Commons representing
"the many." While the House roughly corresponded to
Commons, the Senate did not represent existing aristocratic
elements in American society, but rather its membership
''hinged on choices made by state legislatures, which (because of
their closeness to the people) had a republican complexion of
their own" (p. 97). Even with its longer terms, "the Senate's
purpose was to give its own expression to the popular mindalbeit with emphasis on that part of the mind that saw special
value in 'stability and continuity' in society and government" (p.
97, footnote omitted). Further, the President was elected, held
office for a term of years, and was at least indirectly accountable
to the populace through those elections and through
impeachment (p. 97). "Even the federal judiciary," Coenen
notes, "had republican roots. Although given unlimited terms,
judges would take office only upon appointment by the
President and confirmation by the Senate" (p. 97, footnote
omitted). The institution of judicial review itself bore a
republican gloss because it could be characterized as vindicating
the People's sovereign will. as reflected in the Constitution,
against ultra vires actions undertaken by agents of the electorate
(p. 98).
But republicanism was not synonymous with "democracy";
in fact, the Constitution is anti-democratic in some ways.
Equality in the Senate and the role of the electoral college in the
selection of the President are probably the two best-known ways
in which the Constitution can be said to be anti-democratic (or,
more precisely. anti-majoritarian). The Federalist's emphasis on
"refining" the popular will highlights the authors' hope that
enlightened popular will would be expressed by members of the
federal government. This led to charges of elitism by
antifederalists (p. 99). The Constitution does not provide for
instructions, whereby voters would control the actions of elected
officials once they assumed office. Nor can voters recall elected
officials before the next election (pp. 100-01 ). But for Hamilton
and Madison, these were "features" not "bugs." As Coenen
summarizes: "In the view of Publius, the people (or their state
representatives) were to choose federal legislators but then turn
them loose. This might seem undemocratic, but that was the
point. A meaningful level of insulation would help federal
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officeholders rise above factional politics to pursue a greater
good" (p. 102).
Moreover, as Coenen notes, there is no method for
continuous involvement by "the People" in constitutional
reform, either. In pointed contrast to Thomas Jefferson, who
advocated nullifying all laws-including all constitutions-every
twenty-five years, Madison hoped to cultivate an almost
religious feeling of veneration toward the Constitution. Such
veneration, he argued in The Federalist, would not be
forthcoming if the document could be too easily altered. "In
sum," Coenen writes, "the Jeffersonian approach would-on the
Madisonian view-threaten the people's Constitution with too
much tinkering by the people themselves. Just as representatives
needed independence from voters once they took office, so too
did the framework of government require insulation from
popular manipulation once it was put in place" (p. 103). Thus
while the sovereign People could assert itself and alter the
Constitution, the supermajority requirements both to propose
and ratify amendments ensured they would be rare, as indeed
they have been.
IV.
In his final section on The Federalist itself, Coenen describes
what he calls the "architecture of equilibrium" created by the
Constitution and defended by Madison and Hamilton-their
defense of the specifics of the new government. He begins with
Publius' defense against the charge that the Constitution had
violated the sacred commandment that the powers of
government shall be separated. He then discusses The
Federalist's defense of each branch of government, as well as the
ultimately unsuccessful response to complaints that the
Constitution was fatally flawed because it omitted a bill of rights.
Unlike contemporary state constitutions, the Constitution
17
contained no explicit separation-of-powers provision. That
omission was alarming enough, but to the opponents of the
17. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. L art. XXX ( 1780) ("In the government of this
commonwealth. the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial
powers. or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive
powers. or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws. and not of men.").
Most current state constitutions retain some form of a separation of powers clause. See,
e.g .. ALA. CONST. art. IlL§ 43.
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Constitution the powers of the various officers looked
frighteningly mixed. The President vetoing legislation? The
Senate approving treaties and confirming executive officers?
The Court holding acts of the legislature unconstitutional? What
was going on here? Whatever it was. the antifederalists were
sure that nothing good could come of such unprecedented
1
mixing of powers. Like Patrick Henry. they "smelt a rat."' '
Hamilton and Madison responded that what the
Constitution of 1787 proposed to give the people was not a mere
parchment barrier against tyranny. but a real security against
abuse of power- the end of separation of powers in the first
place. This was achieved. paradoxically. by the very mixing of
powers decried by the Constitution's opponents. Though. as
Coenen notes, ''[t)he terms 'checks and balances· and
'separation of powers' ... appear nowhere in the Constitution
itself,'' the phrases "'capture in a shorthand way themes at the
heart of The Federalist" (p. 107). As conceived by the
Constitution, "each institution of government-occupied by
persons naturally protective of their own turf- had to have
weapons with which to counteract attempted power grabs by
competing centers of authority" (p. 109). Thus. the document
sought a kind of "equilibrium.. and guarded against
concentration of power into any one of the three branches (p.
109).
Further, this horizontal separation was complemented by a
vertical separation of powers between the federal and the state
governments. "Recognizing states as autonomous entities meant
that both they and the central government would carry out
critical functions. This division of functions meant in turn. that
the central government and the states would keep a close eye on
one another" (p. 109. footnotes omitted). This was an entirely
new experiment in government: so revolutionary that Justice
Kennedy once described it as "split[ing] the atom of
sovereignty.··~~ Madison called this dual division of power a
"'double security" against the concentration of power he defined
18. When asked why he refused a place as a delegate to the 1787 Philadelphia
Convention. the famous Patriot is said to have remarked. "I smelt a rat.'' Seep. IX8: Paul
Finkelman. Turning Losers Into Winners: Whar Can We Learn. If Am·thing, From the
Antifederalists. 79 TEX. L. REV. 849. X71 (2001) (book review).
19. U.S. Term Limits. Inc. \.Thornton. 514 U.S. 779. 838 (1995) (Kennedv. 1..
concurring) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty ... ). For an argument. that
Kennedy's metaphor was not quite apt. see Mark R. Killenbeck. The Pln·sics of
Federalism. 51 U. KA:\. L. REV. 1 (200:2).
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as tyranny itself (p. 110). Madison in particular labored against
attacks by antifederalists who predicted-accurately, as it
happened- that the division of power would exert a centripetal
pull towards the central government (pp. 112-18).
Madison and Hamilton spent much of The Federalist
carefully describing and defending the powers given by the
Constitution to each branch of government and parrying attacks
from antifederalists that the powers given were either too great,
given to the wrong branch in violation of separation of powers.
or both. Coenen devotes a chapter a piece to Publius's defense
of the Constitution's delegation of power to the three great arms
of the federal government.
If you took a poll today asking which is ''the most
dangerous" branch, I suspect most people would answer either
the judiciary or the executive branch. Coenen points out,
however, that in the late 1780s, the conventional wisdom was
that legislatures often posed dangers to liberty- especially to
that of property holders or the politically unorthodox. As
Coenen notes. the Framers "faced the ever-ticklish task of
combining energy, stability, and an attentiveness to private
rights" (p. 124, footnote omitted). "On the one hand. the framers
had to avoid impeding legislative prerogatives too much.
particularly in light of basic principles of majority rule. On the
other hand. they well knew that legislative activism carried with
it risks of factional oppression" (p. 124). The Framers threaded
this needle. according to Coenen, by requiring bicamerality, a
representative House, the complementary Senate, and by
limiting federal legislative power to those enumerated in Article
I. section 8. "The combination of these elements," he writes,
"produced a legislative body unlike any the world had previously
seen" (p. 124).
As to the first, "the framers' endorsement of bicameralism
reflected much more than a compromise between frustrated
delegates who represented large and small states. The
requirement of joint action would promote deliberation,
contribute to stability, and confound the sway of 'passions' and
·prejudices' that too often polluted the work of legislative
assemblies·· (p. 127, footnote omitted). Of the two houses, the
House of Representatives fulfilled one of Publius's criteria for
the "construction of a true republic'': "the creation of at least
one legislative body immediately accountable to a broad
electorate" (p. 127). And, as Publius pointed out, decisions
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about the composition of that electorate were left for states to
determine. Madison also defended the two-year term. and the
size of the House, which critics thought to small to ensure real
211
representation.
While the House would have a "populist character oriented
to near-term goals," the Senate "with its lengthy terms. indirect
elections, more exacting qualification rules. and ensured
maintenance of institutional continuity" meant it would "take
the longer view'' and provide security against the passions of
transient majorities (p. 132). Naturally, antifederalists saw the
Senate as a crypto-aristocratic cabal whose function would be to
frustrate the "democratic" initiatives of the House. Publius
refuted such charges, but, of course, there was a grain of truth in
the antifederalist allegations.
Antifederalists also objected to the powers given the new
legislature, however constituted. "Favorite targets of objection
included newly created powers to organize and discipline state
militias, to levy taxes of almost any sort. to oversee federal
elections, and to maintain standing armies." (p. 135). Publius
responded first by noting that the real issue involved
empowering Congress to regulate interstate commerce and have
independent revenue-raising power without depending on states
(p. 135). "Second, the authors of the Federalist parried discrete
challenges to the Constitution's particularized grants of power"
(p. 136). The upshot of Publius's defense was threefold: "(1) the
importance of creating effectual powers of federal fundraising,
(2) the value of uniform federal regulation of foreign and
interstate commerce, and (3) the need for broad discretion in the
choice of means to carry federal powers into effect" (p. 136). As
to the second, Coenen makes a characteristically shrewd
observation that "the new national power over commerce was
not so much about commerce as it was about union. With this
grant of power, the framers sought to cultivate a national
mindset that would lead Americans to view themselves as one
cohesive people" (p. 141).
Not surprisingly, it fell to Hamilton to defend the new
executive created by the Constitution. Many Framers regretted
the fetters the new states placed on governors and the lack of
20. "The Constitution provided that the House ... would create a ratio of roughly
one representative for every 5.000 to 6.000 voters. as opposed to one representative for
every 500 to 600 voters as was the case in most states·· (p. 129. footnote omitted).

90

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:75

any executive in the Articles. But fears of executive abuse
recalled by their colonial experience made many fearful of an
officer that. at best. might equal some of the arbitrary colonial
governors and. at worst. could attempt to set himself up as
monarch. Hamilton derided such fears as so much paranoia and
argued that all that was sought was '"energy'' in the executive
branch-energy '"to act effectively for the nation" (p. 146).
According to Hamilton. '"energy came from four sources: (1)
unity in the executive. (2) continuity in office. (3). possession of
broad powers. and (4) independence from the other branches"
(p. 146. footnote omitted).
Unity meant that there would be one and only one
president. As Hamilton explained. "both strength and restraint
would come from lodging executive power in one person" (p.
147). A dual presidency. on the other hand. would find itself
hampered by disagreement and would not be as transparent.
since it would not be evident whom to blame for bad policies.
Placing responsibility in one person would also tend to make the
holder circumspect in the execution of duties and careful in the
selection of personnel to hold executive office (pp. 147-48).
The four-year term and the absence (then) of presidential
term limits. argued Hamilton. ensured continuity and stabilityHamilton feared radical change. Thus Hamilton warmly
advocated the wisdom of the presidential veto over legislation.
subject to congressional override. Such an executive check
provided. with bicameralism. a second check on bad legislation
(p. 155). He predicted it would not be used frequently. Hamilton
also vigorously defended the President's preeminence in the
conduct of foreign affairs and in the appointment of federal
officials.
Finally. history had shown the need to make executives
independent of legislatures. "Energy in the executive would be
more bane than benefit if the legislature could direct that
energy into schemes of factional oppression" (p. 158). The
President's salary was insulated from legislative meddling. and
one could not serve in both the legislative and executive
departments simultaneously- there was even a prohibition on
a former legislator's service in the executive branch if, prior to
taking office. the legislator had voted to raise the salary for that
21
office.
21.

The emoluments clause. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 6. cl. 1. has occasioned the
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Article III was the shortest article in the Constitution: there
was little discussion of the judiciary or its powers in Philadelphia.
The lack of discussion probably stemmed from consensus-most
thought that the omission of a federal forum from the Articles
was a serious flaw. The Framers remedied that by establishing a
Supreme Court. then leaving Congress the option of establishing
subordinate federal tribunals if it wished- a compromise
intended to forestall complaints that the Constitution's
proponents sought to strip the state courts of all power. Article
III limited the jurisdiction of federal courts to matters of
national (and international) importance and gave Congress the
ability to restrict the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Independence was secured through life tenure, and insulation
for judges' salaries from legislative retaliation. Further. the
manner in which judges would attain office was insulated. to a
significant degree. from the vagaries of public opinion: the
President would nominate judges and the Senate would confirm
them.
Courts would play their role in maintaining the
"equilibrium" in the government by exercising judicial review.
which Hamilton famously defended in Federalist No. 78. Despite
Article III's silence on the question. many at the Philadelphia
Convention seemed to assume that courts would exercise some
independent review over federal and state legislation for
compliance with the Constitution.cc And recent scholarship by
William Treanor strongly suggests that judicial review was an
accepted practice by the time of the Ratification, even if its
precise scope was still contested.c'

lowering of salaries for former legislators who assume executive branch posts whose
salaries were increased during their terms in Congress. This ··work-around." called the
"Saxbe Fix" for William Saxbe. President Nixon's Attornev General. has been
questioned by some. but seems to have been generally accepted ~s a way to get around
the Emoluments Clause. See generalll' Mark Tushnet. Constiflltional Workarounds. g7
TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009) (describing the Saxbe Fix). For doubts about the workaround's
constitutionality. see Michael Stokes Paulsen. Is Llovd Bentsen Unconstitutional 7 • 46
STA!'i. L. REV. 907 (1994).
22. See generally William Michael Treanor. Original Understanding and the
Whether, Why. and How of Judicial Rniew. 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 218 (2007).
23. See William Michael Treanor. Judicial Revin,· Before Marburv. 58 STA~. L.
REV. 455 (2005) (arguing that judicial review was well-estab.lished by the. Framing Era):
hw st'e Theodore \V. Ruger. "A Question Which Convulses a Nation": The Earl1·
Republic's Greatest Dehate Ahout the Judicial Revie"· Power. 117 HARV. L. REV. Ri6
(2004) (describing contested nature of judicial review in the early Republic).
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On one critical issue, however, Publius misfired: the
necessity or desirability of a bill of rights. Framer George
Mason cited the Constitution's lack of a such a bill as his reason
for not signing. Nevertheless, Hamilton argued that any
enumeration of rights risked omitting important rights and
seemed to invite inference that the government possessed
powers not enumerated in Article I. Hamilton, for example,
famously argued that the lack of a free press guarantee was
unnecessary because Article I mentioned nothing about
congressional control of the press.'~
While Coenen sympathetically acknowledges that Publius
wasn't opposed to rights, he nevertheless rightly cites "deep
flaws" in their argument against a bill of rights. The no-powerto-interfere-with-rights argument, for example, ''clashed with
suggestions made elsewhere in The Federalist that broadly
implied powers should and did flow from the Necessary and
Proper Clause" (p. 176). Moreover. the Constitution already
included some security against contingencies unmentioned in
Article I. For example. the Constitution's ban on titles of
nobility "limited no expressly granted power and thus supported
by implication claims to power no less than would a comparable
ban on interference with the press" (p. 177, footnote omitted).
As Coenen also points out, "Publius ignored the helpful
contribution that a Bill of Rights could make to the proper
structuring of the federal government. In particular, if federal
courts were to perform a checking function, they would need
legal rubrics with which to police the other branches" (p. 177).
Perhaps more importantly. bills of rights had become common
features of constitutions-people expected them to be there.
The lack of one in a document bringing forth a new and untested
form of government was simply alarming to many. In any event.
Madison and Hamilton were playing the hand dealt in
Philadelphia. When it was clear their assurances failed to
persuade, Madison faithfully cajoled his fellow House members
to consider one in 1789, during the First Congress when many
25
wanted to renege on that promise.

24.
25.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
See, e.g.. LABUNSKI. supra note 14.
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V.
In the final part. Coenen returns to the story of The
Federalist itself, its role in the ratification of the Constitution,
and its continuing significance today. He opens with the
observation that neither Virginia nor New York's ratification
was technically necessary to the Constitution's coming into being
because New Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify on
June 21, 1788."" However, given the importance of both states. it
would have been folly to attempt to make the new nation a going
concern without them. Coenen writes that a "United States
without Virginia or New York would be a strange,
noncontiguous assemblage of territories likely to spin towards
just the sort of regional balkanization that Hamilton and
Madison most feared" (p. 187). But to play a role in securing
ratification, each first had to be elected to his state's ratifying
convention, which was not assured in either case (pp. 187-204).
In Virginia, Madison- who initially decided against running
for a seat in the ratifying convention, only to relent- took on the
redoubtable Patrick Henry, quietly but expertly parrying
Henry's rhetorical sorties against the Constitution (pp. 189-91 ).
Not only did his work on The Federalist pay off, but Madison
also directed printed sets to be delivered to the state's leaders. In
the end, Madison's efforts (and the willingness of "Governor
[Edmund] Randoph and a handful of westerners who broke
ranks with their antifederalist neighbors" (p. 193)) bore fruit:
Virginia ratified in a close vote, 89-79 (p. 193).
Hamilton faced perhaps even longer odds in New York. The
other members of New York's delegation to Philadelphia pulled
out months before the Convention's work was complete, leaving
Hamilton kicking his heels in Philadelphia. Powerful political
interests in the state resisted incorporation into any national
scheme it would not be in a position to control. The results of the
election to the ratifying convention could not have been less
auspicious. "Forty-six antifederalist candidates had swept to
victory, in comparison to the federalists' brotherly band of just
nineteen" (p. 196). However, Hamilton and his brotherly band
scored an important victory "when perhaps-overconfident
antifederalists agreed to review the Constitution in clause-byclause fashion before any votes were taken'' (p. 197). This both
26. Bv its terms. when ratified bv nine states. the Constitution would become
binding on 'those nine. U.S. COr" ST. art. VII.
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prevented a rush to rejection and allowed Hamilton to bring his
expertise. honed in the writing of The Federalist. to bear. News
of Virginia's ratification also buoyed the Federalists' efforts (p.
198). In the end, ardent antifederalist Melancton Smith proposed
that New York ratify the Constitution and press for amendments
later, reserving the right to secede if they were not forthcoming
(p. 200). This peeled off enough opponents to carry the day for
ratification. if only by three votes (p. 201 ).
There is a strong irony that The Federalist had relatively
little impact on the ratification debate (its raison d'etre), but has
endured as a key to the meaning of the Constitution long after
ratification was an accomplished fact. Coenen spends his
concluding chapter considering The Federalist as "A Work for
the Ages" (p. 205). Why has it endured?
One reason is that the essays are of very high quality.
produced by two of the most brilliant minds of the founding
generation who also happened to be good writers. Another
reason is that "it filled an enormous gap. The Constitution sets
forth rules." writes Coenen, "[i]t does not ... set forth reasons
for those rules. The Philadelphia Convention left behind no
explanatory report, and the first-hand accounts of the
Convention are scarce because delegates agreed to keep their
proceedings secret" (p. 207). Madison's own notes were not
published until1840. Further, it provided a coherent justification
for the whole Constitution, and attempted to demonstrate that
the government-far from being a concatenation of
compromises- had a deep structure (pp. 207 -08). This is one
reason why. as Coenen points out, the judiciary has turned to it
for aid in interpreting the Constitution (pp. 208-13). By
Coenen's count. the Court's resort to The Federalist increased
several-fold in the last decade of the twentieth century and is
likely to be cited as frequently in the twenty-first (p. 213). It is
surely no coincidence that the rise in judicial citations
corresponds to the prominence of originalism in constitutional
interpretation. even among those judges and justices for whom it
is not dispositive.
Whatever the legitimacy or wisdom of judicial (and non27
judicial) reliance on The Federalist, it is clearly regarded as a
legitimate source of constitutional meaning. But Coenen
encourages us to view the eight-five essays as much more than a
27.

Coenen summarizes the arguments for and against on pp. 219-21.
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source for legal cherry-picking. He urges us to admire the effort
and the quality of the essays, as well as their aim. "In the place of
a tempestuous, fractious post-revolutionary America," Coenen
writes, "Publius held up the prospect of a dynamic, yet stable,
society poised to prosper in government, in commerce, and in
spirit" (p. 223, footnote omitted). "At bottom,'' he concludes,
"this was the aim that drove The Federalist Papers" (p. 223).

***
Measured against the aims that Coenen set for himself in
the book's introduction- "to pique interest in the papers" (p.
xi)-his book succeeds brilliantly. It is accessible to the general
reader, yet is useful even to the specialist. The Story of The
Federalist is an ideal companion to Herbert J. Storing's What the
Antifederalists Were For; both, moreover, are best read with a
good edition of The Federalist and Storing's selections from his
The Complete Antifederalist.'x Reading Coenen's book, the
teacher in me is saddened that few undergraduates now are
familiar with The Federalist and that there is little room in law
schools' constitutional law courses for an introduction.
More's the pity, too, because Coenen's book is especially
well-suited for classroom use. He includes in appendices
complete copies of the Constitution and Federalist Nos. 10, 51,
and 78. There is a helpful general index, as well as an index
listing the number of each essay and where it is mentioned in the
work. Experienced scholars will find much of interest in the
lengthy endnotes section, which runs to over one hundred pages.
But one may read Coenen's book with nary a glance at the
notes, because he is skilled at letting Madison and Hamilton
(and Jay!) speak for themselves, without burdening the reader
with lengthy block quotations.
Coenen only departs from his generalist orientation on a
few occasions when he discusses evidence from The Federalist
bearing on legal questions such as the limits on Congress's power
to make "regulations and exceptions" to the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction to keep it from hearing certain classes of
cases (e.g., those dealing with school prayert or whether the
28. THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE OPPONENTS OF THE
COI\OSTITUTION (Herbert J. Storing ed .. 19g5).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III. § 2: Ex Parte McCardle. 74 U.S. 506 (1868) (upholding
power of Congress to deprive Court of jurisdiction over class of cases involving habeas
corpus). The evidence for and against is summarized in ERWII\0 CHEMERII\OSKY.
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federal government can '"commandeer" state and local
government officials to implement federal programs (pp. 172.
10
210-12). Whether one is persuaded by his reading of The
11
Federalist is rather beside the point. What is important, and
what Coenen no doubt intends to show by commenting on
current controversies, is that the questions that preoccupied
Madison and Hamilton-questions about the scope of federal
power. the nature of American federalism, and the relation of
the federal branches to each other-are still with us. Publius's
concerns are still ours today, two hundred twenty years after
those essays appeared.
If the ability of a work to transcend its time and address
future audiences is part of what makes it a "classic,·· then it is
little wonder The Federalist is regarded as a classic of American
political thought. But "classic," alas. also often describes a work
that people discuss but never actually read. Coenen's valuable
contribution is to remind us why the work is so important, and to
spur us to take it off the shelf and read it for ourselves. With
Dan Coenen's book as your guide. the effort will be a little less
daunting.

Co:-.:STITLiTIO:-;AL LAW: PRII'CIPLES A:-;D POLICIES § 2.9 (3d. ed .. 2006 ).
30. Printz v. United States. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating portion of Brady Bill
requiring state law enforcement personnel to perform background checks on purchasers
of firearms). Justices Scalia and Souter both invoked The Federalist to support their
positions. Compare id. at 919-22 with id. at 971-75 (Souter. J .. dissenting).
31. rm not persuaded that the exceptions clause in Article III doesn"t mean
precisely what it says. for example. While it is true that the courts were to be a check on
the other branches. the exceptions clause. providing as it does at least a theoretical check
on the Court itself. seems precisely the sort of interlocking check and balance that is
familiar in the Constitution.

